Challenges to EU values in Hungary : how the European Union misunderstood the government of Viktor Orban / Beata Bako.

Cover -- Half Title -- Series Page -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Dedication -- Table of Contents -- Acknowledgement -- Introduction: The virtuous EU versus the villainous East? -- Chapter 1 Values instead of rules, politics instead of constitutionalism -- 1.1 Rule of law and/or democracy? A question of priority or a question of proportion? -- 1.1.1 Majoritarian and 'liberal' democracy -- 1.1.2 Why the EU stands for liberal democracy and prioritise the rule of law -- 1.1.3 EU rule of law, liberal democracy, and (legal) constitutionalism

1.2 The concurring paradigms of legal and political constitutionalism -- 1.2.1 Legal constitutionalism: when the pouvoir constituant empowers the courts -- 1.2.2 Political constitutionalism: unreasonable trust towards the legislative power? -- 1.3 Article 2 TEU as a provision for legal constitutionalism -- Chapter 2 The attempt to enforce 'common values' -- 2.1 Article 7 TEU: a political bomb, proven not to be nuclear -- 2.1.1 The background of the Article 7 TEU sanctioning mechanism -- 2.1.2 The functioning of the mechanism -- 2.1.3 The main shortcoming of Article 7

2.2 The inevitable failure of soft political tools -- 2.2.1 The weaknesses of the Rule of Law Framework -- 2.2.2 The failed idea of a scoreboard for EU values -- 2.2.3 Instead of a scoreboard: Annual rule of law reports made by the Commission -- 2.3 Buying the rule of law? The new conditionality mechanism -- 2.4 The potential of the ECJ and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights -- 2.4.1 Independent judges and the rule of law: from Portugal to Poland -- 2.4.2 The Polish government is afraid of judges rather than of Article 7 -- 2.4.3 How the issue of the Polish judiciary escalated

2.4.4 The end of mutual trust? -- 2.4.5 The ECJ and the Hungarian judiciary -- 2.4.6 Laws designed for enemies and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights -- Chapter 3 Article 7 TEU in practice, or misunderstanding Hungarian 'illiberalism' -- 3.1 The Hungarian Basic Law is not an 'illiberal' constitution -- 3.2 The waves of the Basic Law: The 'Tavares report' -- 3.2.1 The circumstances of constitution making and amending -- 3.2.2 The extensive use of cardinal laws -- 3.2.3 Limiting the competences of the Constitutional Court

3.2.4 Particular institutional reforms: the Budget Council and the Data Protection Authority -- 3.2.5 The first changes regarding the judiciary system -- 3.2.6 Electoral reform -- 3.2.7 Media freedom -- 3.2.8 Fundamental rights and rights of minorities -- 3.2.9 The main effect of the Tavares report: a chance for sham cooperation -- 3.3 Activating Article 7 TEU: the 'Sargentini report' -- 3.3.1 How MEPs failed to see the big picture -- 3.3.2 The constitutional system and the judiciary: between superficial repetitions and relevant details

The national-conservative government of Hungary has been heavily criticised for its violation of EU values, primarily, the rule of law in recent years. This book looks to the bigger picture in examining the rule-of-law debate between Hungary and the EU. It explores how certain elements of various Hungarian constitutional reforms are interrelated and how the EU has failed to address the situation properly. It is argued here that the reason the EU has been unable to enforce its values effectively in Hungary stems from the misunderstanding that Hungary kept the institutional design of liberal democracy but made it dysfunctional. The debate with the EU is characterised as a dialogue of the deaf as the EU insists on advancing the rule-of-law agenda, while the Hungarian government defends itself by alluding to its democratic legitimacy. The author contends that the Hungarian government is in fact playing a charade, while the actions of the EU maintain this drama. The book will be of interest to students, academics, and policymakers working in the areas of constitutional law and politics, EU law, and populism.