Web and Internet Economics [electronic resource] : 11th International Conference, WINE 2015, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, December 9-12, 2015, Proceedings / edited by Evangelos Markakis, Guido Schäfer.

Sequential Posted Price Mechanisms with Correlated Valuations -- Price Competition in Networked Markets: How Do Monopolies Impact Social Welfare -- Computing Stable Coalitions: Approximation Algorithms for Reward Sharing -- The (Non)-Existence of Stable Mechanisms in Incomplete Information Environments -- Fast Convergence in the Double Oral Auction -- Minority Becomes Majority in Social Networks -- New Complexity Results and Algorithms for the Minimum Tollbooth Problem -- Ad Exchange: Envy-free Auctions with Mediators -- Computing Approximate Nash Equilibria in Network Congestion Games with Polynomially Decreasing Cost Functions -- On Stackelberg Strategies in Affine Congestion Games -- Impartial Selection and the Power of Up to Two Choices -- Online Allocation and Pricing with Economies of Scale -- Multilateral Deferred-Acceptance Mechanisms -- Testing Consumer Rationality using Perfect Graphs and Oriented Discs -- Computation of Stackelberg Equilibria of Finite Sequential Games -- Welfare and Rationality Guarantees for the Simultaneous Multiple-Round Ascending Auction -- Combinatorial Auctions with Conflict-Based Externalities -- Applications of α-strongly Regular Distributions to Bayesian Auctions -- The Curse of Sequentiality in Routing Games -- Adaptive Rumor Spreading -- Privacy and Truthful Equilibrium Selection for Aggregative Games -- Welfare and Revenue Guarantees for Competitive Bundling Equilibrium -- Often Harder Than in the Constructive Case: Destructive Bribery in CP-nets -- Improving Selfish Routing for Risk-Averse Players -- The VCG Mechanism for Bayesian Scheduling -- Incentivizing Exploration with Heterogeneous Value of Money -- Bottleneck Routing with Elastic Demands -- Mechanisms with Monitoring for Truthful RAM Allocation -- Inverse Game Theory: Learning Utilities in Succinct Games -- Query Complexity of Approximate Equilibria in Anonymous Games.